Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data

Lester Lusher, Geoffrey Schnorr () and Rebecca Taylor

No 14105, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: We provide causal evidence of an ex ante moral hazard effect of Unemployment Insurance (UI) by matching plausibly exogenous changes in UI benefit duration across state-weeks during the Great Recession to high-frequency productivity measures from individual supermarket cashiers. Estimating models with day and cashier-register fixed effects, we identify a modest but statistically significant negative relationship between UI benefits and worker productivity. This effect is strongest for more experienced and less productive cashiers, for whom UI expansions are especially relevant. Additional analyses from the American Time Use Survey reveal a similar increase in shirking during periods with increased UI benefit durations.

Keywords: unemployment insurance; shirking; scanner data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I38 J24 J38 J65 L81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 68 pages
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published - published in: American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2022, 14 (2), 285 - 319

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Journal Article: Unemployment Insurance as a Worker Indiscipline Device? Evidence from Scanner Data (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14105

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