Belief Updating About Moral Norms: Does Group Identity Matter?

David Dickinson and Marie Claire Villeval ()
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Marie Claire Villeval: CNRS

No 17892, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We investigate how group identity affects belief updating about moral norms. Using a Belief Updating task, we found that individuals follow a cautious version of Bayesian updating. Group identity itself does not directly affect belief updating. However, when given an information signal about the truthfulness of a normative statement that is dissonant with one’s perceived norm, individuals differ in their resistance to updating beliefs. This difference depends on whether the statement reflects moral norm judgments from people with the same or different political affiliation, and whether the signal supports or opposes honesty. This highlights the importance of understanding how one updates beliefs regarding moral norms, and how the group identity of those making normative judgments can be an important consideration.

Keywords: online experiment; group identity; belief updating; social norms; cheating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-05
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