Trust and Cooperation in Employment Relations: Evidence

Uwe Jirjahn ()
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Uwe Jirjahn: University of Trier

No 19067, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: The issue of trust and cooperation in employment relations is a complex one as multiple actors are involved. The issue not only refers to the vertical relationship between workforce and management, but also to horizontal relationships among workers. Moreover, worker representation through unions or works councils often plays a role in employment relations. This brings a series of further important aspects to the issue – the quality of the relationship between a worker representation body and management, the impact of worker representation on the quality of worker-management relationships, the quality of the relationship between workers and their representation body, and the impact of worker representation on the quality of relationships among workers. This chapter provides a review of the econometric evidence on the determinants, outcomes and dynamics. Econometric research shows that trustful and cooperative employment relations not only have microeconomic consequences at the individual or firm level. They also have macroeconomic implications for the performance of labor markets.

Keywords: cooperative employment relations; trustful employment relations; trajectory of trust and cooperation; unions; works councils; worker representation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D90 J50 J51 J53 M54 M55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-11
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