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Election Fraud and Post-Election Conflict: Evidence from the Philippines

Benjamin Crost, Joseph Felter (), Hani Mansour and Daniel Rees
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Joseph Felter: Stanford University

No 7469, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Previous studies have documented a positive association between election fraud and the intensity of civil conflict. It is not clear, however, whether this association is causal or due to unobserved institutional or cultural factors. This paper examines the relationship between election fraud and post-election violence in the 2007 Philippine mayoral elections. Using the density test developed by McCrary (2008), we find evidence that incumbents were able to win tightly contested elections through fraud. In addition, we show that narrow incumbent victories were associated with an increase in post-election casualties, which is consistent with the hypothesis that election fraud causes conflict. We conduct several robustness tests and find no evidence that incumbent victories increased violence for reasons unrelated to fraud.

Keywords: election fraud; conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2013-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cwa, nep-pol and nep-sea
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7469

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