Ownership and Pay in Britain

Andrew Pendleton (), Alex Bryson and Howard Gospel ()
Additional contact information
Andrew Pendleton: University of Durham
Howard Gospel: King's College London

No 9223, IZA Discussion Papers from IZA Network @ LISER

Abstract: Drawing on principal-agent perspectives on corporate governance, this paper examines whether employees' hourly pay is linked to ownership dispersion. Using linked workplace-worker data from the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) 2011, we find average hourly pay is higher in dispersed ownership workplaces. The raw gap of 30 log points falls to 8 log points when we control for differences in worker and workplace characteristics. The premium is constant across most of the wage distribution, but falls a little at the 90th percentile to become statistically non-significant. This contrasts with earlier papers which indicate that higher level employees are the primary beneficiaries of higher pay from dispersed ownership.

Keywords: principal agent; corporate governance; ownership structure; pay (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G3 G31 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2015-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-hrm and nep-lma
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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Published - published in: British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2017, 55 (4), 688-715

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https://docs.iza.org/dp9223.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Ownership and Pay in Britain (2017)
Working Paper: Ownership and Pay in Britain (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9223

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