Representation, Peer Pressure and Punishment in a Public Goods Game

Hyoyoung Kim, Doruk İriş (), Jinkwon Lee and Alessandro Tavoni
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Hyoyoung Kim: Sogang University
Doruk İriş: Sogang University
Alessandro Tavoni: University of Bologna

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2025, vol. 88, issue 5, No 8, 1407-1433

Abstract: Abstract In our repeated public goods experiment, randomly chosen representatives make decisions on contributions and punishment for both themselves and their team. Confirming previous findings, punishment prevents the decline to the zero-contribution Nash Equilibrium. With punishment, contributions range from 50 to 80%, compared to approximately 30% without it. We also observe a nuanced interplay between hierarchical decision-making and punishment on public good provision. Compared to self-representation, the positive contribution trend is less pronounced when representatives govern the entire team, especially when non-representatives cannot signal preferences, resulting in contributions plateauing around 50% of the endowment.

Keywords: Representations; Peer Pressure; Punishment; Public Goods game; Lab Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 H4 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-025-00970-6

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