How to Deter Financial Misconduct if Crime Pays?

Karol Klimczak, Alejo José G. Sison (), Maria Prats and Maximilian B. Torres ()
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Alejo José G. Sison: University of Navarra Campus Universitario
Maximilian B. Torres: Busch School of Business, The Catholic University of America

Journal of Business Ethics, 2022, vol. 179, issue 1, No 11, 205-222

Abstract: Abstract Financial misconduct has come into the spotlight in recent years, causing market regulators to increase the reach and severity of interventions. We show that at times the economic benefits of illicit financial activity outweigh the costs of litigation. We illustrate our argument with data from the US Securities and Exchanges Commission and a case of investment misconduct. From the neoclassical economic paradigm, which follows utilitarian thinking, it is rational to engage in misconduct. Still, the majority of professionals refrain from misconduct, foregoing economic rewards. We suggest financial activity could be reimagined taking into account intrinsic and prosocial motivations. A virtue ethics framework could also be applied, linking financial behavior to the quest for moral excellence and shared flourishing. By going beyond utilitarian thinking and considering alternative models, we offer a fuller account of financial behavior and a better perspective from which to design deterrence methods.

Keywords: Misconduct; Motivations; Virtue ethics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10551-021-04817-0

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