Single-basined choice

Walter Bossert and Hans Peters

Cahiers de recherche from Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques

Abstract: Single-basined preferences generalize single-dipped preferences by allowing for multiple worst elements. These preferences have played an important role in areas such as voting, strategy-proofness and matching problems. We examine the notion of singlebasinedness in a choice-theoretic setting. In conjunction with independence of irrelevant alternatives, single-basined choice implies a structure that conforms to the motivation underlying our definition. We also establish the consequences of requiring single-basined choice correspondences to be upper semicontinuous, and of the revealed preference relation to be Suzumura consistent.

Keywords: Single-basinedness; choice correspondences; independence of irrelevant alternatives; upper semicontinuity; Suzumura consistency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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http://hdl.handle.net/1866/9774 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Single-basined choice (2014)
Working Paper: Single-Basined Choice (2013)
Working Paper: Single-basined choice (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montde:2013-03

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