Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments

Sylvain Chassang, Gerard Padro i Miquel and Erik Snowberg

No 16343, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the design of randomized controlled experiments in environments where outcomes are significantly affected by unobserved effort decisions taken by the subjects(agents). While standard randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are internally consistent, the unobservability of effort provision compromises external validity. We approach trial design as a principal-agent problem and show that natural extensions of RCTs -which we call selective trials- can help improve the external validity of experiments. In particular, selective trials can disentangle the effects of treatment, effort, and the interaction of treatment and effort. Moreover, they can help experimenters identify when measured treatment effects are affected by erroneous beliefs and inappropriate effort provision.

JEL-codes: C9 C90 C93 D82 O12 O22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
Note: EH LS PR TWP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published as Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padro I Miquel & Erik Snowberg, 2012. "Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1279-1309, June.

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Journal Article: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2012)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
Working Paper: Selective Trials: A Principal-Agent Approach to Randomized Controlled Experiments (2010)
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