The Experimentalist Looks Within: Toward an Understanding of Within-Subject Experimental Designs

John List

No 33456, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The traditional approach in experimental economics is to use a between-subject design: the analyst places each unit in treatment or control simultaneously and recovers treatment effects via differencing conditional expectations. Within-subject designs represent a significant departure from this method, as the same unit is observed in both treatment and control conditions sequentially. While many might consider the choice straightforward (always opt for a between-subject design), given the distinct benefits of within-subject designs, I argue that researchers should meticulously weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each design type. In doing so, I propose a categorization for within-subject designs based on the plausibility of recovering an internally valid estimate. In one instance, which I denote as stealth designs, the analyst should unequivocally choose a within-subject design rather than a between-subject design.

JEL-codes: C9 C90 C91 C92 C93 C99 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm and nep-exp
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Working Paper: The Experimentalist Looks Within: Toward an Understanding of Within-Subject Experimental Designs (2025)
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