The Economics of Civil Service Protections

Guo Xu

No 35568, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The study of bureaucracy as a key dimension of state capacity has gained increasing attention in economics. What organizational features create an effective bureaucracy, however, remains subject to debate. This paper focuses on the central role of civil service protections in delineating the boundary between politics and administration. I introduce a simple principal-agent framework to discuss the key theoretical channels through which political insulation can shape bureaucrat performance. Guided by the framework, I establish stylized facts and organize evidence from historical and contemporary civil service reforms. Overall, the micro-level evidence documents a positive effect of civil service protections on the quality of public service delivery. I conclude with open questions about the political economy of reform adoption.

JEL-codes: D73 M50 P0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-07
Note: POL
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