On the Use of Menus in Sequential Common Agency

Giacomo Calzolari () and Alessandro Pavan

No 1498, Discussion Papers from Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science

Abstract: We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Keywords: Sequential contracting; mechanism design; menus theorems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D89 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: On the use of menus in sequential common agency (2008)
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