The Superiority of Biased Reviewers in a Model of Simultaneous Sales

David Gill, Daniel Sgroi, Churchill College and Department of Applied Economics and University of Cambridge

No 206, Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers the impact of reviewers on sales of products of quality unknown to consumers. Sales occur simultaneously after consideration by a reviewer with a known level of bias. Consumers observe the reviewer`s decision and a private signal. We find that: (a) with flexible prices and signals that are not too revealing the reviewer most biased against the product is best for profits; (b) with flexible prices and very revealing private signals the reviewer most biased in favour is optimal; (c) with fixed prices then a reviewer biased against, but close to unibased, is optimal.

Keywords: Private Information; Reviewers; Bias; Simultaneous Sales; Marketing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-09-01
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:50853cca-a1de-47c1-a1bc-dd6353712635 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oxf:wpaper:206

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Series Working Papers from University of Oxford, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Anne Pouliquen ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).