Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration

Jay Corrigan (), Andreas Drichoutis, Jayson Lusk, Rodolfo Nayga and Matthew Rousu

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: It is generally thought that market outcomes are improved with the provision of market information. As a result, the use of repeated rounds with price feedback has become standard practice in the applied experimental auction valuation literature. We conducted two experiments to determine how rationally subjects behave with and without price feedback in a second price auction. Results from an auction for lotteries show that subjects exposed to price feedback are significantly more likely to commit preference reversals. However, this irrationality diminishes in later rounds. Results from an induced value auction indicate that price feedback caused greater deviations from the Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Our results suggest that while bidding on the same item repeatedly improves auction outcomes, this improvement is not the result of price feedback.

Keywords: bid affiliation; posted prices; induced value experiment; preference reversals; lotteries (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated Rounds with Price Feedback in Experimental Auction Valuation: An Adversarial Collaboration (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:28337

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