Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design

Axel Gautier () and Dimitri Paolini

CREPP Working Papers from Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège

Abstract: In a repeated interaction between and a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Date: 2007
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Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation, externalities and organizational design (2009)
Working Paper: Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rpp:wpaper:0709

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