Prisoners’ Dilemma and Negotiation Types

Marc Helmold ()
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Marc Helmold: IUBH Internationale Hochschule

Chapter Chapter 2 in Successful International Negotiations, 2020, pp 25-29 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The prisoner’s dilemma is a standard example of a game analysed in game theory that shows why two completely rational individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. It was originally framed by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher in the 1950s (Flood et al., 2010). The prisoner’s dilemma is a paradox in decision analysis and negotiations in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not result in the optimal outcome.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-33483-3_2

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