Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

Marcus Pivato

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 2, No 11, 458 pages

Abstract: Abstract Given a large enough population of voters whose utility functions satisfy certain statistical regularities, we show that voting rules such as the Borda rule, approval voting, and evaluative voting have a very high probability of selecting the social alternative which maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function. We also characterize the speed with which this probability approaches one as the population grows.

Date: 2016
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Working Paper: Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rule (2016)
Working Paper: Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules (2014)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0971-2

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