Auction Theory

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 9 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 281-307 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter applies the BNE solution concept to auctions, a strategic setting where players typically face incomplete information. In this context, every player privately knows her valuation for the object being sold (e.g., a painting), but does not observe other bidders’ valuations. Bids, then, are a player’s strategy, and are a function of her privately observed valuation for the object.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_9

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