A general analysis of rent-seeking games

David Perez-Castrillo and Thierry Verdier

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1992, pp 133-148 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we reconsider the basic model of “efficient rent seeking.” We stress the importance of the shape of the players’ reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents.

Date: 1992
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Journal Article: A General Analysis of Rent-Seeking Games (1992)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_8

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_8

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