Other Characteristics of Voting Rules

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 7 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 249-294 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The last chapter showed that different voting rules can be expected to have the greatest Condorcet Efficiency in various types of scenarios, depending upon the type and degree of group mutual coherence that is present in voting situations. The Borda Compromise concluded that BR could generally be expected to perform with relatively good measures of Condorcet Efficiency, without allowing the possibility of having very poor performance. We now continue with an analysis of other features of voting rules, with an emphasis on various properties of BR.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Preference Ranking; Social Choice Function; Strategic Vote; Prefer Candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-03107-6_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_7

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