The Significance of Voting Rule Selection

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
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William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 8 in Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence, 2011, pp 295-329 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A great deal of evidence has been accumulated to support the Borda Compromise when the goal is to select the winning candidate in an election setting. A significant amount of research has also been conducted to determine how significant the impact might be when different voting rules are used. That is, the issue is addressed as to how much difference it actually makes when a voting rule is being selected. The initial exploration of this problem focused on the likelihood that two different voting rules would elect the same winner.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Preference Ranking; Approval Vote; Voter Preference; Prefer Candidate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-03107-6_8

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