A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions

Shurojit Chatterji (), Arunava Sen and Huaxia Zeng ()
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Shurojit Chatterji: School of Economics, Singapore Management University
Huaxia Zeng: School of Economics, Singapore Management University

Theoretical Economics, 2016, vol. 11, issue 2

Abstract: The paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of preferences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice function satisfying a compromise property, is single-peaked. Conversely, every single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence in favour of the Gul conjecture (\citet{barbsurvey}).

Keywords: Random social choice functions; strategy-proofness; compromise; single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-05-18
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions (2016)
Working Paper: A CHaracterization of Single-Peaked Preferences via Random Social Choice Functions (2014)
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