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Wages and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporist Setting: The Netherlands

Joop Hartog (), Edwin Leuven and Coen N. Teulings ()
Additional contact information
Joop Hartog: University of Amsterdam
Coen N. Teulings: SEO, University of Amsterdam

No 00-013/3, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers from Tinbergen Institute

Abstract: In a corporatist country, of which the Netherlands is an example, wages should not be distinguished by union membership status, but by the bargaining regime. Four bargaining regimes can be distinguished: (i) company level bargaining, (ii) industry level bargaining, (iii) mandatory extension of an industry agreement, and (iv) no collective bargaining. Acknowledging firms' bargaining regime, we find small differences between the four regimes, and certainly no distinction between “covered” and “uncovered” firms.

This discussion paper resulted in a publication in the European Journal of Political Economy (2002), 18(2), 317-331.

Keywords: wages; collective bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-23
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Wages and the bargaining regime in a corporatist setting: the Netherlands (2002) Downloads
Working Paper: Wages and the Bargaining Regime in a Corporatist Setting: The Netherlands (1997) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tin:wpaper:20000013

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