Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France

Georges Dionne (), Pierre-Carl Michaud and M. Dahchour

No 2004-79, Discussion Paper from Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research

Keywords: moral hazard; cars; insurance; road construction; safety; panel data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France (2004)
Working Paper: Separating moral hazard from adverse selection in automobile insurance: Longitudinal evidence from France (2004)
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