The Effect Of Benefit Sanctions On The Duration Of Unemployment

Rafael Lalive, Jan van Ours and Josef Zweimüller ()

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, vol. 3, issue 6, 1386-1417

Abstract: This paper investigates the effectiveness of unemployment benefit sanctions in reducing unem-ployment duration. Swiss data on benefit sanctions allow us to separate the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements from the effect of the actual enforce-ment of a benefit sanction. Moreover, public employment services are given substantial leeway in setting the monitoring intensity. Results indicate that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment, and that increasing the monitoring intensity reduces the duration of unemployment of the nonsanctioned. (JEL: J64, J65, J68) Copyright (c) 2005 by the European Economic Association.

Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment (2002)
Working Paper: The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:3:y:2005:i:6:p:1386-1417

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