Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy

Antonio Acconcia, Giovanni Immordino, Salvatore Piccolo () and Patrick Rey

No 13-403, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We develop an agency model of organized crime accounting for the main trade-offs involved by the introduction of an accomplice-witness program. We characterize the optimal policy and identify its main determinants in a framework where public officials can be dishonest. Our predictions are tested by using data for Italy before and after the introduction of the 1991 accomplice-witness program. As predicted by the model and the earlier antitrust literature, the program appears to have strengthened deterrence and enhanced prosecution. Moreover, consistently with a novel prediction of our theory, the evidence suggests that the program efficacy is affected by the judicial system efficiency.

Keywords: Accomplice-witness; Criminal Organizations; Leniency; Whistleblowing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/medias/doc/wp/io/wp_tse_403.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Accomplice Witnesses and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2014)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
Working Paper: Accomplice-Witness and Organized Crime: Theory and Evidence from Italy (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:27211

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().