Compensating Differentials and Self-selection: An Application to Lawyers

John Goddeeris

Journal of Political Economy, 1988, vol. 96, issue 2, 411-28

Abstract: This paper models individual choice between two types of jobs as dependent on the difference i n potential earnings and on preferences for nonpecuniary compensation. The model leads to simultaneous estimation of earnings and job choice functions in a manner that takes account of self-selection of individuals into the sector of highest utility. An application to lawyers choosing between private and "public-interest" law casts doubt on the notion that public-interest lawyers are accepting substantially lower earnings by virtue of their choice-an impression derived from es timation of earnings functions without accounting for self-selection. The estimation technique also takes proper account of the "'choice-based" nature of the sample. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (61)

Downloads: (external link)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/261544 full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers. See http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:96:y:1988:i:2:p:411-28

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Political Economy from University of Chicago Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Journals Division (pubtech@press.uchicago.edu).