Demand for tariff change: causes and consequences for trade lobbying

Francesco Amodio, Fadzayi Chingwere, Jonas Hjort and Anton Reinicke

No wp-2025-102, WIDER Working Paper Series from World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER)

Abstract: We study how strategic inputs—petitions, evidence, and lobbying claims—shape the making and incidence of trade policy. South Africa's International Trade Administration Commission provides a rare, docketed forum where any stakeholder can seek product-specific tariff changes and must justify them with evidence, creating a transparent record of arguments, evaluations, and conditions.

Keywords: Trade; Tariffs; Labour market; Negotiation; Difference-in-differences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp-2025-102

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