An experiment on Nash implementation

Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness and Luis Corchon

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Abstract: We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game.

Keywords: Implementation; experiments; mechanisms; Leex (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D70 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: An experiment on Nash implementation (2003)
Working Paper: An Experiment on Nash Implementation (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:upf:upfgen:300

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