ABSENT–MINDED DRIVERS IN THE LAB: TESTING GILBOA'S MODEL

Steffen Huck and Wieland Müller

International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2002, vol. 04, issue 04, 435-448

Abstract: This note contributes to the discussion of decision problems with imperfect recall from an empirical point of view. We argue that, using standard methods of experimental economics, it is impossible to induce (or control for) absent–mindedness of subjects. Nevertheless, it is possible to test Gilboa's (1997) agent–based approach to games with imperfect recall. We implement his model of the absent–minded driver problem in an experiment and find, if subjects are repeatedly randomly rematched, strong support for the equilibrium prediction which coincides with Piccione and Rubinstein's (1997)ex antesolution of the driver's problem.

Keywords: Imperfect recall; absent-minded driver problem; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B4 C0 C6 C7 D5 D7 M2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa's model (2002)
Working Paper: Absent-minded drivers in the lab: Testing Gilboa's model (2000)
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DOI: 10.1142/S0219198902000793

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