Trading Goods versus Sharing Money - An Experiment Testing Wether Fairness and Efficiency are Frame Dependent

Siegfried K. Berninghaus (), Werner Gueth () and Annette Kirstein ()
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Siegfried K. Berninghaus: Universität Karlsruhe, Postal: RZ Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe
Werner Gueth: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena
Annette Kirstein: WIOR, Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Postal: Postfach 6980, D - 76128 Karlsruhe
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No 03-38, Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications from Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim

Abstract: Systematic experiments with distribution games (for a survey, see Roth, 1995) have shown that participants are strongly motivated by fairness and efficiency considerations. This evidence, however, results mainly from experimental designs asking directly for sharing monetary rewards. But even when not just one kind of monetary tokens is distributed efficiency and fairness are less influential. We investigate and confirm this frame dependency more systematically by comparing net-trade-proposals and payoff-proposals for the same exchange economy with two traders, two commodities and multi-period-negotiations.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2004-01-15
Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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Working Paper: Trading Goods versus Sharing Money - An Experiment Testing Whether Fairness and Efficiency are Frame Dependent (2004)
Working Paper: Trading goods versus sharing money: an experiment testing whether fairness and efficiency are frame dependent (2003)
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