Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information

Carsten Helm and Michael Neugart

No 192, Darmstadt Discussion Papers in Economics from Darmstadt University of Technology, Department of Law and Economics

Abstract: With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by coalition parties, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. Therefore, in coalition governments reforms will be more in line with policy requirements than in single-party governments. This is usually beneficial for the coalition parties as well as for the voter.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; coalition governments; policy reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2024)
Journal Article: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:darddp:dar_35489

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