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Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany

Uwe Jirjahn and John Heywood

VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order from Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Abstract: We use a representative sample of German establishments to show that those with foreign ownership are more likely to use performance appraisal, profit sharing and employee share ownership than are those with domestic ownership. Moreover, we show that works councils are associated with an increased probability of using each of the three practices when under domestic ownership but not when under foreign ownership. These results inform the on-going debate over institutional duality, the extent to which foreign firms adopt uniform practices independent of local institutions and the extent to which they adapt and participate in those local institutions.

JEL-codes: F23 J50 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Variable Pay, Industrial Relations and Foreign Ownership: Evidence from Germany (2011) Downloads
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