More frequent commitments promote cooperation, ratcheting does not

Axel Ockenfels, Carlo Gallier and Bodo Sturm

No 24-065, ZEW Discussion Papers from ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Abstract: International climate negotiations have so far failed to produce ambitious climate cooperation. We combine laboratory experiments with simulations to investigate the performance of two negotiation design features to address this failure: The Paris Agreement's ratchet-up mechanism, which requires countries to gradually increase their ambition, and a new policy proposal to negotiate more frequently. We find that more frequent interactions allow subjects to build trust and cooperation more safely over time. Conversely, subjects in a ratchet-up design tend to become more cautious to protect themselves from free riders. Thus, more frequent revisions of commitments promote cooperation, but the ratchet-up design fails to achieve the same result.

Keywords: Climate change; climate negotiations; cooperation; laboratory experiments; simulations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D02 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:zewdip:312184

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