American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

2009 - 2025

Current editor(s): Johannes Hörner

From American Economic Association
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().

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Optimal Provision of Multiple Excludable Public Goods pp. 1-37: Hanming Fang and Peter Norman
Inequality and Markets: Some Implications of Occupational Diversity pp. 38-76: Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray
Organizing for Synergies pp. 77-114: Wouter Dessein, Luis Garicano and Robert Gertner
Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game pp. 115-36: James D. Montgomery
Security Price Informativeness with Delegated Traders pp. 137-70: Gary Gorton, Ping He and Lixin Huang
Hicksian Welfare Measures and the Normative Endowment Effect pp. 171-94: Thomas Weber
Identification and Semiparametric Estimation of Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions pp. 195-220: Dennis Epple, Michael Peress and Holger Sieg
Naïve Herding in Rich-Information Settings pp. 221-43: Erik Eyster and Matthew Rabin

Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airline Industry pp. 1-43: Steven Berry and Panle Jia
The Political Economy of Debt Bondage pp. 44-84: Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal and Dilip Mookherjee
Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use? pp. 85-105: Dennis Carlton, Joshua Gans and Michael Waldman
Which Inequality? The Inequality of Endowments versus the Inequality of Rewards pp. 106-37: Ed Hopkins and Tatiana Kornienko
Preventing Crime Waves pp. 138-59: Philip Bond and Kathleen Hagerty
Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis pp. 160-85: John Kagel, Yuanchuan Lien and Paul Milgrom
Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians pp. 186-215: Michael Keane and Antonio Merlo

Resource Allocation and Organizational Form pp. 1-33: Guido Friebel and Michael Raith
Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets pp. 34-63: Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz
Open Access and Dynamic Efficiency pp. 64-96: Tilman Klumpp and Xuejuan Su
Are Speculators Unwelcome in Multi-object Auctions? pp. 97-131: Marco Pagnozzi
Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games pp. 132-90: Alessandro Pavan and Giacomo Calzolari
Public Goods, Social Pressure, and the Choice between Privacy and Publicity pp. 191-221: Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective pp. 222-55: Doh-Shin Jeon and Jean Rochet

A Theory of Deception pp. 1-20: David Ettinger and Philippe Jehiel
Investor Sentiments pp. 21-38: Sergei Izmalkov and Muhamet Yildiz
An Experimental Test of Flexible Combinatorial Spectrum Auction Formats pp. 39-57: Christoph Brunner, Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt and John Ledyard
Noise, Information, and the Favorite-Longshot Bias in Parimutuel Predictions pp. 58-85: Marco Ottaviani and Peter Sørensen
Social Reinforcement: Cascades, Entrapment, and Tipping pp. 86-99: Geoffrey Heal and Howard Kunreuther
Information Percolation pp. 100-111: Darrell Duffie, Gaston Giroux and Gustavo Manso
Naïve Learning in Social Networks and the Wisdom of Crowds pp. 112-49: Benjamin Golub and Matthew Jackson
Optimal Sales Schemes against Interdependent Buyers pp. 150-82: Masaki Aoyagi
The 1/d Law of Giving pp. 183-203: Jacob Goeree, Margaret A. McConnell, Tiffany Mitchell, Tracey Tromp and Leeat Yariv
The Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts pp. 204-29: David Martimort and Salvatore Piccolo
Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs pp. 230-55: Hodaka Morita and Michael Waldman

On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal pp. 1-41: B. Douglas Bernheim
A Comment on Bernheim's Appraisal of Neuroeconomics pp. 42-47: Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer
Is There a Method of Neuroeconomics? pp. 48-59: Aldo Rustichini
Neuroeconomics: A Comment on Bernheim pp. 60-67: Joel Sobel
Sniping and Squatting in Auction Markets pp. 68-94: Jeffrey Ely and Tanjim Hossain
Assignment Messages and Exchanges pp. 95-113: Paul Milgrom
Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment pp. 114-32: Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv
Incentive Reversal pp. 133-47: Eyal Winter
A "Dual Self" Representation for Stochastic Temptation pp. 148-67: Kalyan Chatterjee and R. Vijay Krishna
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach pp. 168-98: Alex Gershkov and Benny Moldovanu
Market Culture: How Rules Governing Exploding Offers Affect Market Performance pp. 199-219: Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth
Corruptible Advice pp. 220-42: Erik Durbin and Ganesh Iyer

Editor's Note pp. iii-iii: Andrew Postlewaite
Assessing Strategic Risk pp. 1-16: Robert Aumann and Jacques Dreze
Asymmetric Networks in Two-Sided Markets pp. 17-52: Attila Ambrus and Rossella Argenziano
The Geography of Trade in Online Transactions: Evidence from eBay and MercadoLibre pp. 53-74: Ali Hortacsu, F. Asís Martínez-Jerez and Jason Douglas
Contracting with Third Parties pp. 75-100: Sandeep Baliga and Tomas Sjostrom
Moral Hazard and Customer Loyalty Programs pp. 101-23: Leonardo J. Basso, Matthew T. Clements and Thomas Ross
Like Father, Like Son: Social Network Externalities and Parent-Child Correlation in Behavior pp. 124-50: Antoni Calvó-Armengol and Matthew Jackson
The Compromise Game: Two-Sided Adverse Selection in the Laboratory pp. 151-81: Juan D. Carrillo and Thomas Palfrey
Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types pp. 182-206: Olivier Compte and Philippe Jehiel
The Origin of the Winner's Curse: A Laboratory Study pp. 207-36: Gary Charness and Dan Levin
Reputational Incentives for Restaurant Hygiene pp. 237-67: Ginger Zhe Jin and Phillip Leslie