Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov and Leeat Yariv

American Economic Review: Insights, 2022, vol. 4, issue 1, 18-33

Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

JEL-codes: C78 D11 D21 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
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DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20210123

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