Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Leeat Yariv, Marcelo Ariel Fernandez and Kirill Rudov

No 15873, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty.

Keywords: Deferred acceptance; Incomplete information; Matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D49 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2022)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
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