Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov and Leeat Yariv

No 29043, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-isf and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published as Marcelo Ariel Fernandez & Kirill Rudov & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review: Insights, vol 4(1), pages 18-33.

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Journal Article: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2022)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
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