Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information

Marcelo Ariel Fernandez, Kirill Rudov and Leeat Yariv

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small infusion of uncertainty about others' preferences.

Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2022)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
Working Paper: Centralized Matching with Incomplete Information (2021)
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