Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory

Pierpaolo Battigalli () and Martin Dufwenberg

Journal of Economic Literature, 2022, vol. 60, issue 3, 833-82

Abstract: The mathematical framework of psychological game theory is useful for describing many forms of motivation where preferences depend directly on one's own or others' beliefs. It allows for incorporating, for example, emotions, reciprocity, image concerns, and self-esteem in economic analysis. We explain how and why, discussing basic theory, experiments, applied work, and methodology.

JEL-codes: C70 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Working Paper: Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory (2020)
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DOI: 10.1257/jel.20201378

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