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ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT

Changxia Ke, Kai Konrad () and Florian Morath ()

Economic Inquiry, 2015, vol. 53, issue 2, 854-871

Abstract: type="main" xml:id="ecin12151-abs-0001"> Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting . ( JEL D72, D74)

Date: 2015
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Related works:
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2014)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2012) Downloads
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