Alliances in the shadow of conflict

Changxia Ke, Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" from WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the holdup problem.

Keywords: conflict; contest; alliance; hold-up problem; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-his
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/58350/1/717085090.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT (2015)
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2014)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2013)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2012104

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