Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict
Kai Konrad () and
Florian Morath ()
No 4056, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance’s ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players’ contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting.
Keywords: conflict; contest; alliance; endogenous internal conflict; hold-up problem; non-aggression pact; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT (2015)
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2014)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2013)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012)
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4056
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