Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

Changxia Ke, Kai Konrad and Florian Morath

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. We consider experimentally when members of victorious alliances accept a peaceful division of the spoils, and when they fight against each other, and how the inability to commit to a peaceful division affects their effort contributions in their fight against a common enemy. First, we find that an asymmetric split of the prize induces a higher likelihood of internal fight and, in turn, reduces the effort contributions in the fight against a joint enemy. Second, non-binding declarations on how to divide the spoils in case of victory do not help to mitigate the hold-up problem.

Keywords: Conflict; contest; alliance; hold-up problem; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2012-03.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT (2015)
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2014)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2013)
Working Paper: Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict (2012)
Working Paper: Alliances in the shadow of conflict (2012)
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