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EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE?

Joseph Clougherty (), Tomaso Duso (), Miyu Lee and Jo Seldeslachts ()

Economic Inquiry, 2016, vol. 54, issue 4, 1884-1903

Date: 2016
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Journal Article: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence? (2016) Downloads
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence? (2015) Downloads
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