Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence?

Joseph Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee and Jo Seldeslachts

No 515981, Working Papers of Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven

Date: 2015-11
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Published in FEB Research Report - MSI_1512

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https://lirias.kuleuven.be/retrieve/346096 MSI_1512 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE? (2016)
Journal Article: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence? (2016)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
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