Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence?

Joseph Clougherty, Tomaso Duso, Miyu Lee and Jo Seldeslachts

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2016, vol. 54, issue 4, 1884-1903

Abstract: We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990–2009 period. Our empirical results suggest phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as - unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions - phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries, that is, industries where the Herfindahl Hirschman Index is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Journal Article: EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE? (2016)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
Working Paper: Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:180832

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