Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence
Joseph Clougherty (),
Tomaso Duso (),
Miyu Lee and
Jo Seldeslachts ()
No 1523, Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin from DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
We estimate the deterrence effects of European Commission (EC) merger policy instruments over the 1990-2009 period. Our empirical results suggest that phase-1 remedies uniquely generate robust deterrence as – unlike phase-1 withdrawals, phase-2 remedies, and preventions – phase-1 remedies lead to fewer merger notifications in subsequent years. Furthermore, the deterrence effects of phase-1 remedies work best in high-concentration industries; i.e., industries where the HHI is above the 0.2 cut-off level employed by the EC. Additionally, we find that phase-1 remedies do not deter clearly pro-competitive mergers, but do deter potentially anti-competitive mergers in high-concentration industries.
Keywords: Merger; deterrence; European Commission; merger policy; competition policy; antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K40 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42 p.
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-ind and nep-law
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Journal Article: EFFECTIVE EUROPEAN ANTITRUST: DOES EC MERGER POLICY GENERATE DETERRENCE? (2016)
Journal Article: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence? (2016)
Working Paper: Effective European Antitrust: Does EC Merger Policy Generate Deterrence (2015)
Working Paper: Effective European antitrust: Does EC merger policy generate deterrence? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1523
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