Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports

Stefan Szymanski and Stefan Kesenne

Journal of Industrial Economics, 2004, vol. 52, issue 1, 165-177

Abstract: This paper shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (197)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00220.x

Related works:
Chapter: Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports (2010)
Working Paper: Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports (2003)
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