Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports

Stefan Szymanski and Stefan Kesenne

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: This paper shows that under reasonable conditions that increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.

Keywords: Team sports; Contest (tournament) theory; Competitive balance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2003-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/6f7850/9f030fd6.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Chapter: Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports (2010)
Journal Article: Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2003003

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